Oral Arguments

Missouri Association of School Librarians, et al. v. Melesa Johnson, et al., and State of Missouri, et al.

Missouri law criminalizes providing obscene materials or performances to minors. In 2022, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 775, enacting section 573.550, RSMo, which prohibits any person affiliated with a public or private elementary or secondary school from providing “explicit sexual material” (as defined in statute) to students. In February 2023, the Missouri Association of School Librarians and the Missouri Library Association (collectively, the challengers) sued, arguing section 573.550 improperly regulates constitutionally protected speech and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The state and its attorney general (collectively, the state) intervened. Both sides moved for summary judgment (judgment based on the court filings, without a trial). The circuit court granted summary judgment to the challengers, declaring section 573.550 facially unconstitutional under article I, sections 8 and 10 of the state constitution and permanently enjoining the state from enforcing it. The state appeals.

This appeal presents several questions about whether the circuit court misapplied the law in holding section 573.550 unconstitutional:

• Whether the statute violates the state constitution’s free speech provisions – including whether disseminating published material is an expressive activity; whether this regulated activity is protected or excluded from protection under article I, section 8; whether the statute is drawn narrowly to avoid regulating protected expression; and whether the state can regulate school-sponsored speech reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
• Whether the challengers established the statute, on its face, is void for vagueness in violation of article I, section 8 and the due process clause of article I, section 10 – including whether the statute defines terms clearly, uses objective or subjective criteria, and gives fair and adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited.
• Whether the circuit court erred in permanently enjoining section 573.550 – including whether the circuit court made every effort to harmonize the statute with the state constitution and save as much of the statute as possible, severing only unconstitutional parts of the statute, or whether the only remedy was to invalidate the statute in its entirety.
• Whether this Court should dismiss the appeal or disregard portions of the briefing for alleged violations of procedural rules.

Hippos, LLC v. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services

Article XIV of the state constitution legalizes the use and sale of medical marijuana and authorizes the state’s department of health and senior services to license a certain number of cultivators, manufacturers, dispensaries, and testing facilities. The department established a scoring system to rank competing applicants in each category; contracted with Wise Health Solutions LLC to perform the scoring; and provided Wise a facility scoring guide, facility license application question and scoring criteria, and an evaluation scoring criteria table. Hippos LLC submitted 14 applications for licenses to operate cultivation, infused-products manufacturing, and dispensary facilities. Wise scored all applications; the department did not change any scores. The department then applied scoring adjustments and ranked the applications within each facility type. Based on this scoring and ranking process, the department awarded Hippos one cultivation license but denied Hippos’ two other cultivation applications, all six manufacturing applications, and all five dispensary applications. Hippos appealed to the administrative hearing commission, challenging the credentials of the person who scored Question 64 in Hippos’ manufacturing license applications, how Wise scored the applications, the mathematics the department used to rank applicants by score, and the department’s ultimate decisions denying the licenses. The commission consolidated the appeals for an evidentiary hearing in February 2021. The commission affirmed the department’s decisions for all three sets of denials. Hippos sought judicial review. In August 2023, the circuit court entered its judgment affirming the commission’s decisions. Hippos appeals.

This appeal presents several questions:

• Whether competent and substantial evidence supports the commission’s denial decision – including the impact of two expert witnesses who testified Hippos’ answers to questions should have scored higher; whether the department’s cross-examination sufficiently contradicted their testimony or credibility; whether the commission improperly disregarded the experts’ testimony or found it unpersuasive; and whether there was sufficient evidence for the commission to consider the scorers’ subjective preferences in reassessing the scoring.
• Whether the commission’s denial decision (as to the cultivation facility licenses) was arbitrary and capricious – including whether the decision results in disparate treatment of similarly or identically situated applicants and whether evidence supports an inference the commission found the expert testimony about Hippos’ scores unpersuasive or not due as much weight as the scores Wise assigned.
• Whether competent and substantial evidence supports the commission’s denial decision (as to the manufacturing licenses) – including whether the scorer assigned to Question 64 was qualified to score the answer and whether the state constitution prohibits any entity from holding more than three manufacturing licenses.

In re: Venus V. Harry

Attorney Venus Harry was a solo practitioner in St. Louis County who received admonishments in 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2018. In January 2012, this Court suspended her law license, stayed the suspension, and placed her on one year of probation; she completed probation, and the Court terminated it in January 2014. In September 2021, this Court indefinitely suspended Harry’s law license, with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least two years. The suspension order required her to stop accepting new clients or cases, withdraw from pending matters, notify clients of her suspension so they could arrange other representation, and deliver pending files to those clients. Harry subsequently opened a consulting business, offering paralegal services to law firms. The chief disciplinary counsel brought new disciplinary charges against Harry for conduct during her suspension. At an evidentiary hearing, the parties disputed both the extent of her compliance with the suspension order and the nature of payments she received. The disciplinary hearing panel ultimately found several rule violations: Harry failed to withdraw from all matters within 15 days of the suspension order; authorized other attorneys to file substitutions of counsel without client authorization; continued communicating with clients about their cases; accepted multiple advanced legal fee payments and deposited them into her law firm account; and failed to deliver one client’s complete file for three months after the suspension. It recommended disbarment, which the chief disciplinary counsel accepted, asking this Court to disbar Harry. Harry rejected the recommendation, arguing she should receive no more than a suspension – retroactively dated to September 2023 – with eligibility to seek reinstatement after two years.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Harry violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

In re: Kimberly M. Gardner

Kimberly Gardner previously served as St. Louis city’s elected circuit attorney. In August 2022, this Court found she had violated several rules of professional conduct, reprimanded her, and ordered her to pay $5,004.33 in fees and costs. She retained Michael Downey – whose practice focuses on lawyer-discipline defense – to determine whether the circuit attorney’s office could pay or reimburse those costs. In October 2022, Downey gave Gardner a written legal opinion stating there was “no legal prohibition against a lawyer’s employer or firm paying taxed costs or reimbursing a lawyer” for such payments and concluding, if her office deemed reimbursement appropriate under its own policies, “it would be appropriate for you to receive reimbursement for the $5,004.33 in costs that have been taxed to you.” Gardner then asked the Court for a payment plan, which it approved. She made four separate personal payments from October 2022 to May 2023. She subsequently sought reimbursement from the circuit attorney’s office contingent fund, submitting proof of each payment. When the chief clerk asked whether such reimbursements were permissible, Gardner – relying on Downey’s opinion – said yes, and the clerk issued her reimbursement checks. The United States attorney’s office for the Eastern District of Missouri later investigated these payments and determined section 56.530, RSMo, restricted the contingent fund to the proper and vigorous prosecution of the duties of the office, precluding its use to reimburse Gardner for personal expenses unrelated to her job of the office’s operation. In July 2024, Gardner entered a diversion agreement with the United States attorney’s office, deferring federal prosecution for misappropriating the funds used to reimburse her disciplinary costs. The United States attorney’s office notified the chief disciplinary counsel, who brought new disciplinary charges against Gardner. Following an evidentiary hearing, the disciplinary hearing panel found a single violation of Rule 4-8.4(b) (governing misconduct), recommending Gardner be reprimanded. Both parties rejected the recommendation. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to disbar Gardner, while Gardner contends the evidence does not establish a Rule 4-8.4 violation, disbarment is grossly disproportionate to her conduct, and that any sanction imposed should be no greater than a reprimand.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Gardner violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

Cathi Utley v. Steven M. Pelton, Sheriff of Franklin County

Article III Institute, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al.

In re: Dale Robert Funk

Crystal Gray, Individually and as Next Friend of Minors C.G., E.G., and Connie Gray, as Class I Beneficiaries of William Gray, et al. v. Modine Manufacturing Company and Hamilton Sundstrand Corporation

Sandra K. Farrell, et al. v. HGP Management LLC

200 W Armour Boulevard LLC v. Tabitha A. Judson

In re: Matthew Alexander Perry